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VERTICAL TIES ACROSS BORDERS: DO 
JAPANESE PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
JEOPARDIZE COMPETITIVE MARKETS IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA? 
WALTER HATCH 
Although economists and political scientists have shown a growing 
interest in the problem of market concentration, and in the use of 
competition policy to address this problem, most academics have confined 
themselves to the study of single economies, thus ignoring the global or 
regional context in which multinational corporations (MNCs) operate. 
Even when academics have stepped outside the domestic context, they 
have limited their analyses to horizontal agreements1 between MNCs in 
developed economies.2 As a result, little has been written about vertical 
restraints that impact developing economies. 
In this Article, I strive to fill part of the void in the academic literature 
by carefully considering the impact of vertical integration and quasi-
integration via foreign direct investment (FDI) on markets in developing 
economies. More specifically, I ask the following question: under what 
conditions are MNCs able to use vertical restraints—particularly 
exclusionary supply and distribution arrangements—to raise entry costs 
for prospective competitors, thereby securing dominant positions in host 
country markets? 
I address this question by examining Japanese manufacturing networks 
in Southeast Asia.3 In particular, I examine the following two industries: 
(1) the automobile industry (clearly dominated by Japanese MNCs), and 
(2) the electronics industry (not dominated by any particular set of 
MNCs). While not conclusive, the evidence suggests that industry 
  Lecturer and Tamaki Fellow, Jackson School of International Studies, University of 
Washington. The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance from Shannon Mills. 
 1. One notable example of these agreements is the market allocation investment cartel. 
 2. Economists generally view horizontal cooperation with more suspicion than vertical 
cooperation because the former tends to undermine efficiency while the latter actually may enhance it. 
See BERNARD HOEKMAN, COMPETITION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: A DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE 12 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1735, 1997), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/trade/pdf/wp1735.pdf; UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997: 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY, at 192-210 
(1997).  
 3. Unless otherwise defined in the text, “Southeast Asia” refers to the four core members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
 
 
233 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p233 Hatch book pages.doc  10/15/02   11:09 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
234   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:233 
 
 
 
 
 
characteristics, the national “consciousness” of MNCs, and host as well as 
home government policies ultimately determine the ability of 
multinational enterprises to use vertical integration and quasi-integration 
to acquire market power in developing economies. 
I begin by discussing the economic theory behind the process of 
development, and proceed to summarize empirical studies on MNCs and 
market power. I then discuss the institution of keiretsu, or interfirm 
groupings, which emerged in Japan after World War II and were partially 
replicated in Southeast Asia in the 1990s. After summarizing my findings, 
I conclude by calling for further research on vertical foreclosure and other 
restrictive business practices that transcend national borders and that have 
been, until now, woefully underanalyzed. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCE 
The current interest in applying Anglo-American competition policy 
prescriptions to developing economies may be sadly misguided. Such 
prescriptions flow from neoclassical economic theory, which omits the 
critical variable of technological change from its otherwise robust model 
and thus confuses the process of development with the operation of the 
market in advanced capitalist economies.4 Development is a dynamic 
process through which firms may achieve declining long-run average costs 
by adopting successively more sophisticated technology.5 Without a 
mechanism to facilitate interfirm collaboration, this process leads to both 
overinvestment and excess capacity as firms rush to enter those industries 
characterized by declining costs. By contrast, market operation in 
advanced capitalist economies typically is more stable. Described quite 
adequately in most modern economics textbooks, this process is 
characterized by increasing long-run costs (or diminishing returns), and 
thus stable equilibria. 
Those who encourage developing economies to embrace Anglo-
 4. This remains largely correct despite the heroic efforts of “new growth” theorists such as Paul 
Romer and Robert Lucas, Jr. These scholars move beyond the Solow growth model (which shows how 
economic growth is driven by increases in the capital stock and labor force, plus increases in a residual 
that is presumed to be technical knowledge) by explicitly incorporating technological change into a so-
called “new growth” model. Unfortunately, however, this approach is still not very useful because it is 
highly abstract and relies heavily on a number of strong assumptions designed to improve its 
mathematical tractability. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 3, 3-42 (1988); Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth, 94 J. 
POL. ECON. 1002, 1002-37 (1986).  
 5. YASUSUKE MURAKAMI, AN ANTI-CLASSICAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: A VISION 
FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 144-82 (Kozo Yamamura trans., 1996). 
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American competition policy should study history more carefully. In the 
late nineteenth century, when the United States was undergoing a process 
of technological “catch-up,” large U.S. firms organized themselves into 
“trusts” and proceeded to dominate important sectors like the railroad, 
steel, and chemical industries. In the 1920s and 1930s, financial cliques 
and manufacturing combines in both Germany and Japan cooperated much 
in the same way, and in the process propelled those economies toward 
industrialization. The exercise of market power in these dynamically 
developing economies came with steep costs, measured most tangibly in 
the loss of consumer surplus. However, it also created benefits, as 
producers achieved what has been called “dynamic technological 
efficiency”6 (or “Schumpeterian efficiency”7) by adopting successively 
more sophisticated technology, thereby reducing long-term average 
production costs and gaining increased competitiveness in domestic and 
foreign markets. 
Back in those days, policymakers in emerging economies made fairly 
uncomplicated calculations, measuring the costs of collusion against the 
benefits of concentration. Today, however, with the growing presence of 
MNCs in developing economies, the calculations are much more difficult 
because the benefits of concentration are far less likely to remain in the 
host economy. MNCs are able to internalize many transactions (using, for 
example, transfer pricing to repatriate profits) and thus siphon off a 
significant share of those benefits for themselves. 
II. MNCS AND MARKET CONCENTRATION 
Several studies have found a positive correlation between FDI and high 
levels of market concentration in developing countries.8 For example, 
 6. “Dynamic technological efficiency” is discussed thoroughly in WALTER HATCH & KOZO 
YAMAMURA, ASIA IN JAPAN’S EMBRACE: BUILDING A REGIONAL PRODUCTION ALLIANCE, at xii-xiii, 
21 (1996). 
 7. “Schumpeterian efficiency” is discussed thoroughly in Giovanni Dosi et al., Trade, 
Technologies, and Development: A Framework for Discussing Japan, in POLITICS AND 
PRODUCTIVITY: HOW JAPAN’S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY WORKS 19 (Chalmers Johnson et al. eds., 
1989). 
 8. See, e.g., Sanjaya Lall, Multinationals and Market Structure in an Open Developing 
Economy: The Case of Malaysia, 115 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV [REVIEW OF WORLD 
ECONOMICS] 325, 325-48 (1979); JOHN M. CONNOR, THE MARKET POWER OF MULTINATIONALS: A 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO 65-83 (1977); Magnus 
Blomström, Multinationals and Market Structure in Mexico, 14 WORLD DEV. 523, 523-30; Dani 
Rodrik, Imperfect Competition, Scale Economies, and Trade Policy in Developing Countries, in 
TRADE POLICY ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 109-43 (Robert E. Baldwin ed., 1988). See 
generally UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS VOL. 1: The THEORY OF 
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evidence shows that 84% of foreign subsidiaries in Mexico and 83% of 
foreign subsidiaries in Brazil operated in industries where the four largest 
firms had a combined market share (i.e., a “four-firm concentration ratio”) 
of more than 50%, while 21% of the foreign subsidiaries in Mexico and 
58% of the subsidiaries in Brazil operated in industries where the four-
firm concentration ratio was greater than 90%.9 
It is possible that the causal arrow runs not from FDI to market 
concentration but rather from market concentration to FDI. In other words, 
high levels of market concentration may stimulate entry by foreign MNCs. 
It also is possible that the observed correlation reflects nothing more than 
the fact that market concentration and FDI share common characteristics. 
In developing economies, industries characterized by product 
differentiation and heavy investment in research and development tend to 
be oligopolistic and filled with affiliates from foreign firms.10 However, it 
seems much more likely that MNCs do in fact contribute to higher levels 
of market concentration in developing economies. The firm-specific assets 
such as technology and brand names that, according to Stephen Hymer11 
and Richard Caves,12 allow MNCs to establish international operations 
may also enable them to dominate the foreign markets into which they 
enter. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) voiced just such a concern: “[F]oreign investors may often be 
able to acquire substantial market power in some product markets in 
developing countries, giving them the possibility of abusing their 
dominant positions in these markets.”13 
The difficult question is not whether MNCs dominate markets in many 
developing economies, but how they do so. MNCs may use predation to 
either drive rivals from a market or simply keep them from entering it, and 
yet economists indicate that predatory practices are irrational, impose 
excessively high costs on the predator, and even then do not deter entry 
because rivals know that the predator cannot maintain such costly price 
cutting for very long.14 However, Paul Milgrom, using a model of 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (John H. Dunning ed., 1993). 
 9. THEODORE H. MORAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW 
POLICY AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ECONOMICS IN TRANSITION 23 (1999). 
 10. UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 140. 
 11. See STEPHEN H. HYMER, THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL FIRMS 217-29 
(1976). 
 12. See RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 177-80 
(2d ed. 1996). 
 13. UNCTAD, ASIAN AND PACIFIC DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND THE FIRST WTO 
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE: ISSUES OF CONCERN 241 (1996). 
 14. See John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289, 289-330 (1980). 
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asymmetric information, shows that firms operating in multiple markets 
have an incentive to use restrictive business practices to build a reputation 
for predation.15 In other words, predatory behavior by MNCs actually may 
be quite rational. 
UNCTAD has provided a list of other restrictive practices that MNCs 
may use to dominate markets.16 These include: 
international price fixing, collusive tendering, or market allocation; 
predatory pricing to break into markets (possibly using transfer 
pricing mechanisms); discriminatory pricing or resale price 
maintenance;17 anticompetitive mergers or joint ventures with local 
or other foreign enterprises; restraints upon access to information 
networks or databases; or tie-in requirements of supplementary 
goods, services or technology.18 
However, even this lengthy list does not include various forms of cross-
border integration or quasi-integration that may lead to vertical 
foreclosure. MNCs can locate different parts of the production process in 
different economies, thereby creating vertically linked manufacturing 
networks, or “commodity chains,” that dominate markets.19 Economists 
tend to dismiss such concerns, suggesting that often vertical agreements 
are efficient and hence should not be deemed anticompetitive per se.20 In 
this Article, I suggest that Japanese MNCs have tried to replicate keiretsu-
like production networks in Southeast Asia that, in some cases, may 
indeed undermine competition. 
 15. Paul Milgrom, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280, 280-
312 (1982). 
 16. See UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 241-42. 
 17. Resale price maintenance may be facilitated by market segmentation through the use of 
intellectual property rights to prevent parallel imports, refusals to deal, control of distribution channels, 
exclusivity restraints or export restraints. 
 18. UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 241-42. 
 19. See generally GARY GEREFFI & MIGUEL KORZENIEWICZ, COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM (1994) (providing information relating to the history, organization, and geography of, and 
consumption related to, commodity chains). 
 20. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 219-21 (The 
MIT Press, 2000) (1992); Shyam Khemani & Mark Dutz, The Instruments of Competition Policy and 
Their Relevance for Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Claudio Frischtak ed., 1995); DENNIS CARLTON & JEFFREY PERLOFF, 
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 378-95 (3d ed. 2000). See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988). 
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III. KEIRETSU DEFINED 
Although the term keiretsu has entered the lexicon of educated 
Americans who follow public policy issues, its true meaning continues to 
elude popular understanding both outside and inside Japan. Keiretsu 
(literally, “lineage groups”) neither operate within a hierarchical 
framework directed by a central power (the “visible hand” of Alfred 
Chandler’s ideal bureaucratic organization),21 nor as autonomously self-
regulating and impersonal units (the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith’s 
ideal market organization).22 Rather, they function as “hands interlocked in 
complex networks of formal and informal interfirm relationships,”23 and 
therefore fall somewhere between hierarchy and market. Members of 
keiretsu networks are legally independent but informally bound together 
by practices like cross-shareholding, interlocking directorates, and intra-
group trade, as well as capital, technology, and personnel transfers. 
Keiretsu are most often associated with the giant conglomerates 
clustered around main banks (“city banks”) that serve as credit lifelines 
and management monitoring institutions for member firms. Each keiretsu 
tries to maintain one and only one company in every sector of the Japanese 
economy—a practice that has come to be called Wan Setto Shugi (“One 
Settism”). Thus, each keiretsu usually will have one major automaker, one 
electronics manufacturer, one chemical manufacturer, one life insurance 
company, one brewery, and so on. In addition, each keiretsu always will 
have a major trading company that serves as the group’s logistics 
coordinator and international intelligence-gathering unit. Throughout most 
of the period following World War II, Japan has had six such “horizontal” 
keiretsu. Four of these—Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Yasuda (now 
called Fuyo)—were zaibatsu, or “financial cliques,” before the war, and 
quickly reconstituted themselves as keiretsu after the American occupation 
ended. Two other keiretsu—Dai-Ichi Kangyo and Sanwa (all named after 
their main banks)—eventually followed suit.24 
 21. See generally ALFRED DUPONT CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (stating that the advantages of coordinating multiple 
units within a single enterprise are only fully realized within a managerial hierarchy, which itself 
ultimately becomes its own source of growth, power, and permanence). 
 22. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976). 
 23. MICHAEL L. GERLACH, ALLIANCE CAPITALISM: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE 
BUSINESS 3 (1992). 
 24. The Dai-Ichi Kangyo group was not actually formed until 1971, when the Dai-Ichi and 
Kangyo banks merged. 
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Here I focus on two other institutions of interfirm cooperation, both of 
which are vertically organized: the supply keiretsu and the distribution 
keiretsu. Supply keiretsu, which link machinery assemblers and parts 
suppliers, emerged in the 1960s as manufacturers hoping to reduce 
transaction costs began to rely more heavily on dedicated subcontractors 
for parts production. Automakers and electrical appliance manufacturers, 
in particular, constructed and dominated their own supply clubs. Toyota 
was one of the first to do so, building a massive pyramid by using a 
number of first tier subcontractors who called on a larger number of 
second tier subcontractors, who relied on an even larger number of third 
tier subcontractors, and so on. 
Resources flow in both directions inside a supply keiretsu. In most 
instances, contracting firms (assemblers or upper tier suppliers who 
contract for the supply of components) provide their trusted subcontractors 
with capital and technology, as well as a relatively stable market. In 
exchange, they receive high quality parts “just in time” through the 
kanban system.25 Although based on reciprocal exchange, the relationship 
between contractor and subcontractor is rarely “equal.” The contractor is 
generally more technology- and capital-intensive while the subcontractor 
is more labor-intensive. This inequality manifests itself during periods of 
economic slowdown, when contractors routinely secure steep price 
reductions in the parts they procure from their subcontractors. Indeed, 
parts prices rarely are negotiated upwards. 
The second vertically organized “lineage group” is the distribution 
keiretsu. The distribution keiretsu is a legacy of the early postwar years, 
when Japan’s manufacturing industry grew faster than wholesalers and 
retailers could move and sell all the newly produced goods. 
Manufacturers, particularly those producing consumer electronics, 
automobiles, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals, overcame this obstacle by 
setting up and maintaining their own distribution networks. Each one 
established a complete marketing channel, investing in and providing 
management and technical support to selected members of its network. 
Each secured nearly absolute control over that channel, using rebates, 
territorial sales restrictions, single-outlet-single-account systems, and other 
mechanisms to exert ongoing pricing authority. Like supply keiretsu, 
distribution keiretsu are characterized by cooperation (“reciprocal 
 25. The kanban system is a simple coordination system that ensures the delivery of parts to the 
production line as and when needed. The system uses standard containers with a single card attached. 
Work stations located along production lines only produce desired parts when they receive a card and 
an empty container, thereby indicating that more parts are needed in production. 
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exchange”), but not by parity in bargaining power. For example, 
manufacturers may either withhold capital, personnel, and other assistance 
from wholesalers who try to operate outside established networks, or deny 
rebates to retailers who do not aggressively market their brands or 
slavishly follow their pricing guidelines. 
At the end of the twentieth century, the institution of keiretsu was 
under enormous pressure to change as globalization forced firms to 
consider ways to cut fixed costs and become more price competitive—not 
only in overseas markets but in Japan as well. Main banks merged across 
keiretsu boundaries while manufacturers purchased parts from a 
streamlined network of suppliers and moved their goods through a more 
diverse network of wholesalers and distributors. Although these 
developments are noteworthy, they are not nearly as revolutionary as 
many observers have suggested. Indeed, one could argue that keiretsu in 
Japan have “re-raveled” more than they have “unraveled.” Consider, for 
example: 
Horizontal keiretsu. After Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank (Mitsui 
Group) announced plans to merge, Sumitomo Chemical and Mitsui 
Chemical indicated they would follow suit. In addition, after Fuji 
Bank (Fuyo Group) indicated it would merge with Dai-Ichi Kangyo 
Bank, NKK (Fuyo), a major steel manufacturer, moved to link 
operations with Kawasaki Steel (DKG).26 
Supply keiretsu. Manufacturers are reducing the overall number of 
linkages they maintain with subcontractors but are simultaneously 
forging tighter ties with those who remain in their networks. For 
example, in the latter half of the 1990s, Toyota actually increased its 
equity stake in its largest suppliers and sent more of its 
representatives to serve on their corporate boards.27 
Distribution keiretsu. Automakers have loosened ties with some car 
dealers, but have tightened bonds with others—even after the 
Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) launched a major 
investigation in the early 1990s and pushed the automakers to steer 
clear of the retail sector. Hiroshi Iyori,28 a former JFTC member, 
 26. Japan’s Keiretsu: Regrouping, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2000, at 74.  
 27. Kaisha Shikihô [Company Directory], Tôyô Keizai Shimpôsha, vol. 3, Summer 1999. 
 28. See Hiroshi Iyori, Japanese Cooperation in International Antitrust Enforcement, in 
COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW: APPROACHING AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF ANTITRUST LAW 
253 (Hanns Ullrich ed., 1998). 
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expresses disappointment that Japanese vehicle manufacturers were 
able to maintain these “exclusive dealing arrangements.”29 
IV. KEIRETSU: EXCLUSIONARY, EFFICIENT, OR BOTH?  
Kozo Yamamura argues that keiretsu may reduce transaction costs for 
members and thus enhance efficiency, but he asserts that keiretsu are 
exclusionary because “it is difficult for non-members, particularly foreign 
firms, to become part of a group of firms maintaining an interfirm 
relationship.”30 Iyori offers a somewhat different, but equally mixed 
assessment. He states that “even if competition among keiretsu groups 
helped to spark strong competition in the domestic market,” these groups 
“may, in fact, contribute to market foreclosure to the extent that they 
strengthen the unity and cooperation of keiretsu participants.”31 
Consider first the debate over horizontal keiretsu. Robert Lawrence 
provides empirical evidence that these keiretsu groups, represented by 
their general trading companies (GTCs), serve as a private barrier to 
foreign goods that might otherwise compete with goods produced at home 
by group members.32 Specifically, Lawrence finds that Japanese imports 
include an unusually high volume of intrafirm shipments from Japanese 
affiliates operating overseas to parent firms in Japan.33 GTCs, he finds, 
protect their keiretsu associates: “If foreign goods are directly competitive 
with domestic products, they will have difficulty entering” the Japanese 
market.34 On the other side of this debate, David Weinstein and Yishay 
Yafeh offer an entirely different explanation for Lawrence’s empirical 
findings. They argue that keiretsu actually intensify competition, which 
explains why foreign firms have such a hard time breaking into markets 
supplied by keiretsu members.35 The foreign firms simply cannot cope in 
 29. A 1993 study commissioned by the U.S. Commerce Department and Japan’s Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) found that Japanese manufacturers controlled a majority of 
the shares in 32% of the members of the Japan Automobile Dealers Association. In the United States, 
by contrast, the study found that domestic manufacturers held shares (including minority shares) in 
less than 2% of U.S. automobile dealerships. See Booz, Allen and Hamilton et al., Final Report for the 
MOSS Motor Vehicle Study, at 6-7 (1998). 
 30. Kozo Yamamura, Will Japan’s Economic Structure Change? Confessions of a Former 
Optimist, in JAPAN’S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT CHANGE? 22 (Kozo Yamamura ed., 1990). 
 31. Iyori, supra note 28, at 252 (emphasis added). 
 32. Robert Lawrence, How Open is Japan?, in TRADE WITH JAPAN: HAS THE DOOR OPENED 
WIDER? 9-37 (Paul Krugman ed., 1991). 
 33. Id. at 15. 
 34. Id. at 23. 
 
 35. David E. Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, Japan’s Corporate Groups: Collusive or Competitive? 
An Empirical Investigation of Keiretsu Behavior, 43 J. INDUS. ECON. 359 (1995). 
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such a hyper-competitive environment. 
Now consider both forms of vertical networking (distribution and 
supply keiretsu), which Paul Sheard36 emphatically states “are not 
anticompetitive, and have nothing to do with price-fixing.”37 Vertical 
foreclosure by keiretsu members, he argues, is not a serious concern.38 
However, there is considerable evidence to suggest that, in the 1960s, 
Japanese consumer electronics manufacturers, backed by the Japanese 
government, used their tightly controlled distribution keiretsu to seal up 
the Japanese market. By the mid-1970s, two-thirds of appliance stores 
were solidly affiliated with a single manufacturer, and three-quarters of 
consumer electronics products moved through these keiretsu outlets.39 
Vertical restraints blocked new entrants, enabling manufacturers of 
electronic products (particularly televisions) to collude on prices. In 
addition, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), acting on behalf 
of Kodak Film, alleged that Japanese government officials helped Fuji 
Film achieve vertical foreclosure in the photographic film and paper 
market. In its 1996 complaint to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the USTR presented evidence that in the 1970s Fuji, with help from the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), set up an 
exclusionary distribution network using rebates and sales promotion 
payments to exert control over the four major photographic film and paper 
wholesalers in Japan. According to the complaint, these four wholesalers 
moved film only for Fuji.40 
What about supply keiretsu? It is conceivable, Sheard writes, that 
Japanese automakers could achieve vertical foreclosure by restricting 
access to their parts subcontractors in Japan.41 However, he quickly 
 36. Paul Sheard, Keiretsu, Competition, and Market Access, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 
541 (Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson, eds., 1997). 
 37. Elsewhere, Sheard softens this conclusion by arguing that keiretsu ties reflect long-term 
contracting, which, in turn, is based on commitment. However, commitment itself is simply the flip 
side of exclusion. “A commitment to honor a long-term contract is a promise to exclude certain actions 
as possibilities . . . Thus exclusion goes hand in hand with commitment in long-term contracting and 
enhances the efficiency of organizing economic transactions. In short, the kind of exclusionary 
behavior associated with Japanese keiretsu ties may be of quite a different kind from that connoted by 
the language and logic of antitrust.” Paul Sheard, Keiretsu and Market Access: An Economics of 
Organisation Approach, in JAPANESE FIRMS, FINANCE, AND MARKETS 42-43 (Paul Sheard ed., 1996). 
 38. Sheard, supra note 36, at 541.  
 39. Kozo Yamamura & Jan Vandenberg, Japan’s Rapid-Growth Policy on Trial: The Television 
Case, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE 
PERSPECTIVES 253 (Gary Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986). 
 40. The WTO dismissed the case on December 5, 1997, saying it could find no evidence that the 
Japanese government itself had engaged in any illegal conduct. 
 41. Sheard, supra note 36, at 523. 
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dismisses this possibility, noting that “it has not been raised as a serious 
issue. U.S. automakers are not complaining that Toyota, Nissan, and other 
Japanese automakers are limiting their ability to compete by discouraging 
their affiliated suppliers from supplying them.”42 This may be a function 
of Japan’s developmental stage. Keiretsu ties would appear to create more 
costs (opportunity costs due to “information impactedness”) than benefits 
(reduced transaction costs from implicit, long-term contracting) in a 
developed or mature economy. On the other hand, in a developing 
economy where firms are still adopting technology from the global supply 
of existing technical knowledge, such ties would seem to create more 
benefits than costs. With this in mind, it is intriguing to note that U.S. 
automakers struggling to compete in Southeast Asia have alleged exactly 
what Sheard correctly suggests they have not alleged in Japan: Japanese 
automakers are restricting their ability to compete in Southeast Asia by 
discouraging keiretsu subcontractors from supplying them. 
V. JAPANESE AUTOMOTIVE MNCS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Japanese automakers have been assembling vehicles in Southeast Asia 
since the 1960s, when import substitution policies first drew them to the 
region. By the mid-1990s, however, a handful of Japanese firms 
dominated virtually every one of these markets.43 As Table One 
demonstrates, five Japanese firms—Toyota, Isuzu, Nissan, Mitsubishi 
Motors, and Honda—accounted for more than 85% of sales in Thailand 
during the first half of 1997.44 As Table Two shows, during about the 
same time period, another five Japanese firms—Toyota, Mitsubishi 
Motors, Suzuki, Isuzu, and Daihatsu—accounted for nearly 83% of sales 
in Indonesia.45 This was despite an aggressive campaign by the Indonesian 
government to promote sales of its “national automobile,” the Timor. 
Although comparative data on concentration levels in different 
Southeast Asian economies are rare, Kelly Bird produced an index of such 
 42. Id. 
 43. In the rest of Asia, Japanese automakers have experienced mixed results. While they gained 
market power in Taiwan, they did not in South Korea, where the government imposed tight restrictions 
on both direct investment by foreign manufacturers and the export of CBU (completely built-up, or 
finished) vehicles from Japan. For all of its supposed independence, however, the auto industry in 
South Korea is deeply dependent on Japan for technology. China is the only Asian country that does 
not depend on Japan for either capital or technology. 
 44. This percentage includes imports and domestically produced vehicles. See Table 1, infra at 
259. 
 45. See Table 2, infra at 259. 
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levels in different Indonesian industries.46 According to Bird’s study, the 
automotive sector is Indonesia’s most highly concentrated industry, with a 
four-firm ratio of 100%.47 It is one of only a handful of industries that has 
not experienced any reduction in concentration levels since 1975, when 
Indonesia began to liberalize its trade policies.48 
One reason Japanese MNCs managed to acquire such tremendous 
control over automobile markets throughout Southeast Asia is that they, 
more than their American and European rivals, were willing and able to 
forge tight bonds with political and business elites in host countries. As 
Jochen Legewie notes, Japanese automakers made “extensive use of 
informal networks including the sometimes extra-legal accommodation” 
of politicians and bureaucrats.49 Kineko Kamo notes further that they 
complied with government requirements to enter into equity tie-ups with 
local capitalists, even though they sometimes ended up with minority 
positions in these joint ventures.50 In addition, Japanese automakers 
remained in these markets during the late 1970s and 1980s, while U.S. 
automakers retreated from Asia and refocused resources on threatened 
positions in the domestic market. 
One other explanation warrants consideration. Japanese MNCs 
consolidated their control over Southeast Asian automobile markets partly 
by replicating the long-term and mutually reinforcing ties they had 
carefully forged with suppliers at home. These keiretsu ties allowed them 
to raise entry costs for rival assemblers, thereby achieving vertical 
foreclosure by locking up the market for higher value-added parts 
produced in the host economy. This, in turn, allowed Japanese automakers 
in Southeast Asia to strengthen ties of horizontal cooperation. For 
example: 
In 1995, Toyota, Nissan, and Isuzu agreed to jointly establish 
casting plants and other facilities in Thailand to produce cylinder 
heads, cylinder blocks, connecting rods, camshafts, and crankshafts 
 46. See Kelly Bird, Concentration in Indonesian Manufacturing, 35 BULLETIN OF INDON. ECON. 
STUD. 43, 43-73 (1999). 
 47. Id. at 60. Two other industries—wheat flour and alcoholic liquors—share that dubious honor. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Jochen Legewie, Driving Regional Integration: Japanese Firms and the Development of the 
ASEAN Automobile Industry, in FACING ASIA: JAPAN’S ROLE IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
DYNAMISM OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 4-5 (Verena Blechinger & Jochen Legewie eds., 2000). 
 50. Kineko Kamo, Nihon Jidôsha Kigyô no Gurôbaru Senryaku to Ajia Keizaiken [The Global 
Strategies of Japanese Automobile Companies and the Asian Economic Sphere], in AJIA NO JIDÔSHA 
SANGYÔ 43, 46-50 (Murayama Yoshinari ed., 1997). 
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used in the assembly of pickup trucks there.51 “To compete against 
American and European producers, we needed to find a way to 
reduce costs even further,” explained Tezuka Hiroyuki, president of 
Siam Toyota Motors, which produces cylinder blocks for the three 
automakers.52 
In 1994, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. and Suzuki Motor Corp. teamed 
up to use common components for the passenger trucks that they 
independently—and competitively—assembled in Indonesia: 
Mitsubishi agreed to contribute left-side doors while Suzuki agreed 
to contribute the roof and right-side doors.53 
In 1993, Honda and Isuzu reached an agreement to compensate for 
each other’s weaknesses in their respective lines of automobiles. In 
Thailand, this meant that Honda sold a repackaged Isuzu pickup 
called the Tourmaster while Isuzu offered a born-again Honda Civic 
called the Vertex.54 
Horizontal cooperation between nominally competitive Japanese 
automakers has occurred not only within individual countries in Southeast 
Asia, but also regionally. For example, the Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (JAMA), prodded by MITI, organized a 
regionwide trade association—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Automotive Federation (AAF)—“with a view of enhancing the 
intra-regional cooperation of automobile industries.”55 The AAF, 
according to industry representatives, is JAMA’s surrogate in Southeast 
Asia.56 
It is important to trace the process by which Japanese automakers 
expanded the geographic locus of their vertical keiretsu, thereby affording 
them greater opportunity to cooperate with one another. In the 1990s, 
Japanese assemblers operating in places like Jakarta and Bangkok 
pressured their domestic suppliers to follow them into Southeast Asia. 
 51. ASAHI SHINBUN, Jan. 4, 1995, at 9. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Toru Hirose, Southeast Asia: From Cheap Labor to Rich Markets, NIKKEI WKLY., June 
20, 1994, at 24. 
 54. Siam Future Development Co., Ltd., The World in Thailand: Isuzu Motors, at 
http://www.siamfuture.com/WorldInThai/isuzu.asp (last visited Dec. 8, 2001). 
 55. Chairman’s Summary of the 4th Automobile Experts Meeting from ASEAN, CLM, and 
Japan 2 (Mar. 21, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review). 
 56. Numerous interviews conducted with Japanese automobile industry representatives in 
Bangkok, Thail. and Jakarta, Indon. (Sept. 1997).  
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This pressure yielded dramatic results: in just six years (1991 through 
1996), Japanese autoparts manufacturers made 223 investments in the 
ASEAN-4 countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines). 
Previously, it took manufacturers twenty-nine years (1962 through 1990) 
to make only 182 investments in those countries.57 
Just as they did at home in an earlier period, Japanese automakers 
moved quickly in the 1990s to establish cohesive supply groups in each 
Asian country in which they operated. These groups, managed by 
representatives of key suppliers but which meet regularly under the 
auspices of the assembler, even carry the same name as the vertical 
keiretsu in Japan after which they are patterned. Thus, in Thailand, Nissan 
has its Thai “Takara-kai,” dominated by local affiliates of its most trusted 
Japanese subcontractors; Mitsubishi Motors has its Thai “Kashiwa-kai;” 
Toyota has its Thai “Kyôhô-kai;” and so on. 
Due to the limited size of the automobile markets in each host country 
in Southeast Asia, Japanese subcontractors who invested in the region 
would never have been able to achieve economies of scale by supplying 
only their main keiretsu customer. Thus, by necessity, they initially 
supplied multiple customers. However, by the mid-1990s, when 
automobile markets in host countries began to expand quite rapidly, 
transaction patterns long established in Japan began to take shape in Asia. 
Tadashi Nishioka, focusing on ASEAN, concluded “with the exception of 
those cases in which an established supplier has stayed home, we find very 
few examples of Japanese automakers [in Southeast Asia] engaging in 
transactions outside their established keiretsu groups.”58 This trend was 
particularly evident in Thailand, Southeast Asia’s fastest growing 
automobile market. Thus, Hiroyuki Kasahara argues that Japanese 
automakers in Thailand are seeking to capture “relational quasi-rents” by 
conducting almost all of their business with Japanese subcontractors who 
belong to their parent firm’s keiretsu network.59 
Consider the case of Siam Nissan Motors (SNM), the Thai affiliate of 
the prominent Japanese (now French-Japanese) automaker. All of Nissan’s 
leading keiretsu suppliers in Japan have either established parts 
 57. Legewie, supra note 49, at 9. 
 58. Tadashi Nishioka, ASEAN ni okeru Jidôsha Sangyô no Dôkô to Wagakuni Chûshô Buhin 
Mêkâ e no Eikyô ni tsuite [The State of the Automobile Industry in ASEAN, and its Influence on 
Japanese SME Parts Producers], CHÛSHÔ KÔKO REPÔTO NO. 98-1, at 66 (Japan Finance Corporation 
for Small Business 1998) (emphasis added). 
 59. Hiroyuki Kasahara, Transfer and Adaptation of Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships from 
Japan to Thailand: A Case of the Automobile Industry 23 (July 28, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author). 
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manufacturing facilities in Thailand or forged technology licensing 
agreements with local Thai firms. The only automobile part that SNM 
buys from a wholly unaffiliated firm is the muffler and tail pipe unit.60 In 
addition, consider Toyota Motors Thailand, which relies almost 
exclusively on parts manufactured by either Toyota’s keiretsu suppliers in 
Japan or by the transplants of those suppliers in Thailand. Table Three 
provides a list of the thirty-two Japanese members of the Toyota supply 
club in Thailand as of 1997.61 The list includes the affiliates of most of 
Toyota’s major subcontractors in Japan. In fact, the parent companies of 
all but four of these Thailand-based affiliates belong to Toyota’s supply 
club in Japan. 
For outsiders attempting to set up competing assembly plants in 
Southeast Asia, these strong business ties between Japanese assemblers 
and keiretsu suppliers represent a barrier to entry. In the first half of the 
1990s, Chrysler (now DaimlerChrysler) labored to break into Southeast 
Asia’s growing automobile market by establishing major production 
facilities in several locations.62 However, it was stymied repeatedly in its 
efforts to negotiate solid contracts for parts with leading suppliers, all of 
which happened to be Japanese transplants belonging to various keiretsu. 
Tim Suchyta, then director of Chrysler’s regional operations, tells the 
story: “We had some outright rejections that made absolutely no business 
sense at all. In Malaysia, for example, we had an AC [air conditioning] 
supplier who simply refused to have anything to do with us. It seemed 
pretty clear that he had been instructed to just say no.”63 
General Motors (GM) encountered a similar problem when it tried to 
break into the Thai market. “A number of suppliers said they could not do 
business with us,” recalls Ronald Frizzell, president of GM Thailand.64 
Thus, the U.S. manufacturer approached Thailand’s Board of Investment 
and asked it to waive its domestic content requirement for passenger cars 
assembled in Thailand. The Thai government, eager to enhance the 
competitiveness of its automobile industry, granted GM’s request. To 
some, this decision came as a surprise; until then, leading Japanese 
automakers had wielded almost absolute influence over Thailand’s auto 
 60. Interview with Sasaki Kunihiko, Representative, Nissan Motors, in Atsugi, Japan (July 8, 
1997). 
 61. See Table 3, infra at 260-61. 
 62. For more on Chrysler’s unhappy experience in Southeast Asia, see Kozo Yamamura & 
Walter Hatch, A Looming Entry Barrier: Japan’s Production Networks in Asia, in ANALYSIS, Feb. 
1997, at 15-16. 
 63. Id. at 16. 
 64. Telephone interview with Ronald Frizzell, President, GM Thailand (Sept. 23, 1997). 
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industrialization policies.65 For instance, a senior managing director of 
Toyota Motors Thailand, Ninnart Chaithirapinya, was at that time the 
chairman of the Thai Automotive Industry Association. Similarly, 
Nattavat Praepriwngam, a key advisor to the Toyota Cooperation Club, the 
automaker’s supply keiretsu in Thailand, was also the president of the 
Thai Auto Parts Manufacturers Association.66 It therefore seemed highly 
unlikely that the Thai government would do anything drastic to jeopardize 
the market power of the Toyota-led Japanese automakers. 
However, Thai government officials had become both increasingly 
upset about their country’s growing trade deficit with Japan and frustrated 
over what they viewed as the slow pace of technology transfer by Japanese 
firms. In a profile of the Thai automobile industry that was written in the 
hope of luring prospective investors, particularly non-Japanese investors, 
the Thai Board of Investment (BOI) voiced this frustration: “The Japanese 
have never been keen on transferring design and engineering expertise to 
their Thai counterparts.” The BOI pragmatically suggested that “[in] both 
component and supporting industry segments, the most efficient way for 
many foreign firms to enter the market is through joint ventures with 
wholly owned Thai companies with minimal keiretsu ties.”67 
It should be noted that Japanese automobile assemblers in Southeast 
Asia also have established strong business ties with automobile 
distributors throughout the region. In at least one case, such ties may have 
led to a different form of vertical foreclosure, but one with virtually the 
same result: unreasonably high entry costs.68 In the mid-1990s, General 
Motors Indonesia found that it could not expand production of passenger 
cars in Indonesia because it could not secure additional dealer outlets. Len 
Brownfield, a former GM executive, tells the story: 
I had seven well-established guys lined up to be new Chevy-Opel 
dealers. But one by one, they mysteriously fell out. In the end, none 
 65. For those paying attention to multilateral trade negotiations, this decision by the Thai 
government likely did not come as a surprise. Under the WTO’s 1995 Agreement On Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), member countries pledged to end such domestic content requirements 
by January 1, 2000. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2 & 
Annex, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994). 
 66. Yamamura & Hatch, supra note 62, at 15.  
 67. Thai Board of Investment, Investment Opportunities Study: Automotive and Autoparts 
Industries in Thailand (1995), available at http://www.boi.go.th/english/execsummary/f7a.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2002). 
 68. Yamamura & Hatch, supra note 62, at 15. 
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of them would agree to work with us. They told me privately that [a 
Japanese manufacturer for whom they do almost all of their 
business] had threatened to cut off their supply if they did.69 
Southeast Asia is not the only overseas location in which Japanese 
automakers have faced criticism for replicating homegrown, exclusionary 
keiretsu ties. In the 1980s, U.S. auto parts manufacturers pressed similar 
charges, alleging that they could not secure supply contracts with Japanese 
assemblers operating in the United States. The chief obstacle, they told 
investigators from the U.S. General Accounting Office, was created by 
“preexisting relationships between Japanese automakers and their 
suppliers.”70 However, these complaints did not persist for long. U.S. parts 
suppliers soon reported that they had managed to negotiate a growing 
number of business deals with Japanese automakers.71 This result is not 
surprising, for with both Congress and the U.S. International Trade 
Commission conducting investigations, the political fire could not have 
gotten much hotter for Japanese automakers in the United States. 
In sharp contrast, the bargaining position of host regimes in Southeast 
Asia is relatively weak. Unlike U.S. suppliers, local suppliers in Southeast 
Asia often are unable to meet the stringent technical requirements set by 
Japanese automakers. In addition, unlike the U.S. market, which is by far 
the world’s largest, automobile markets in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines are still relatively small. Therefore, threats to limit 
Japanese access to any one of those markets would seem hollow, if not 
laughable. In fact, as long as Japanese automakers continue to produce 
high levels of employment for local workers and high profit rates for local 
joint venture partners, host regimes probably will resign themselves to the 
status quo. Despite the exclusionary behavior of leading firms and the lack 
of competitiveness of Southeast Asia’s automobile industry in global 
markets, host regimes are unlikely to turn up the political heat and risk 
losing tangible benefits for their constituents. 
 69. Id. 
 70. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: GROWING 
JAPANESE PRESENCE IN THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY, REP. NO. GAO/NSIAD-88-111, at 36 (1988). 
 71. See Ulrike Wassmann & Kozo Yamamura, Do Japanese Firms Behave Differently? The 
Effects of Keiretsu in the United States, in JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: SHOULD 
WE BE CONCERNED? (Kozo Yamamura ed., 1989). 
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VI. JAPANESE ELECTRONICS MNCS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Japanese electronic manufacturers moved aggressively into both 
Southeast Asia and China in the 1990s.72 Like the automakers, the 
electronics manufacturers tried to replicate their domestic keiretsu 
networks throughout the region. In a study conducted for the Thai 
government, the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) concluded 
that Japanese affiliates in Asia’s electronics industry “tend to bring their 
own subcontractors from Japan or create their own satellite subcontractors, 
neither of which generates significant backward linkages with domestic 
firms.”73 From an industry survey, Toru Sunada, Michiko Kiji, and 
Makoto Chigira discovered that 70% of the “local” suppliers used by 
Japanese electrical and electronic machinery assemblers in the region 
actually are Japanese parts producers operating in host economies.74 
Furthermore, in a sophisticated econometric study, Rene Belderbos found 
that keiretsu linkages drive Japanese electronics firms to invest in 
Southeast Asia, while more traditional determinants (i.e., firm-specific 
assets such as research and development capability and marketing 
expertise) lead them to invest in North America and Europe.75 However, 
despite having built their own regional supply networks, Japanese 
electronics manufacturers, unlike Japanese automobile manufacturers, do 
not completely dominate Southeast Asian markets. In Thailand, for 
example, the leading disk drive producer is a U.S. MNC, Seagate 
Technology, that employed thirty thousand Thai workers in the mid-
1990s. In Malaysia, three U.S. MNCs—Intel, Texas Instruments, and 
Motorola—have emerged as leading semiconductor manufacturers. 
In some subsectors of this broad industry (particularly consumer 
electronics), Japanese firms enjoy market power in Southeast Asia, just as 
they do in many other parts of the world. For this reason, MITI was able to 
broker a rather loose wage cartel among Japanese consumer electronics 
 72. “Electronics” is an ill-defined and thus broad industrial class that covers everything from 
electrical appliances (including refrigerators and rice cookers) to office automation equipment 
(including computer peripherals and copy machines). 
 73. FOREIGN INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICE, IMPEDIMENTS TO BACKWARD LINKAGES AND 
BUILD: THAILAND’S NATIONAL LINKAGE PROGRAM 41 (1991). 
 74. TORU SUNADA ET AL., JAPAN’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN EAST ASIA: CHANGING 
DIVISION OF LABOR AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE HOUSEHOLD ELECTRONIC APPLIANCE 
INDUSTRY 64 (MITI Research Institute, Discussion Paper No. 10, 1993). 
 75. Belderbos uses a multinominal logit model to study the factors that caused 204 Japanese 
electronics and precision machinery manufacturers to either invest or not invest in different regions of 
the world before June 1989. See RENE A. BELDERBOS, JAPANESE ELECTRONICS MULTINATIONALS 
AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICIES 201-29 (1997). 
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manufacturers in Malaysia in the early 1990s. The agreement on wage 
guidelines was reached after Sony upset the industry by using a relatively 
attractive salary schedule to lure skilled technicians to its new plant near 
Penang and away from other Japanese facilities in the area.76 
Overall, the electronics industry in Southeast Asia is far more 
competitive than the automobile industry, and evidence suggests it has 
become increasingly so over time. In Indonesia, for example, Kelly Bird 
estimates that the industry’s four-firm concentration ratio was 43% in 
1993—a sharp decline from its 85% ratio in 1975, and well below the 
automobile industry’s persistently high ratio of 100%.77 
Why are Japanese electronics firms in Southeast Asia unable to achieve 
the kind of market power that Japanese automakers in the region have 
enjoyed? One reason relates to a fundamental difference in the nature of 
these two industries. While a piece of electrical machinery may include 
dozens of parts, an automobile is made up of thousands of parts. Thus, an 
automaker can achieve vertical foreclosure more easily by building an 
exclusionary supply network. An additional, more important reason 
pertains to a difference in the amount of government support and 
protection received by the two industries. In Southeast Asia, the 
electronics industry is generally less coddled than the automobile industry, 
and thus MNCs using flexible and global sourcing strategies to secure 
parts in this industry are able to reduce production costs and compete 
effectively against other MNCs that use more stable supply networks. 
Michael Borrus argues that, by the early 1990s, U.S. producers of 
industrial electronics (like computers and communications equipment) 
found themselves dangerously dependent on “a closed oligopoly” of 
Japanese rivals for essential components such as memory chips and 
displays: “The only alternative . . . was to make the supply architecture 
more open and competitive: In conjunction with government policies and 
local private investors in Asia, U.S. firms gradually turned their Asian 
production networks into a flexible supply base alternative to Japanese 
firms.”78 
Although Mr. Borrus may be guilty of hyperbole, the logic of his 
analysis is compelling. Far from being able to exercise vertical 
foreclosure, Japanese electronics manufacturers in Asia have been forced 
 76. Doug Tsuruoka, Gathering of the Clan, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 28, 1991, at 52. 
 77. Bird, supra note 46, at 60. 
 78. Michael Borrus, Left for Dead: Asian Production Networks and the Revival of U.S. 
Electronics, in THE CHINA CIRCLE: ECONOMICS AND ELECTRONICS IN THE PRC, TAIWAN, AND HONG 
KONG 139, 145 (Barry Naughton ed., 1997). 
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to revise their strategies just to remain competitive in the market. Thus, 
Mr. Nishioka notes that Japanese consumer electronics firms in Asia now 
routinely purchase parts from sources outside their own established 
keiretsu groups—behavior that remains relatively rare in the automobile 
industry.79 Moreover, confidential interviews I conducted in 1997 
indicated that Japanese MNCs in Southeast Asia are moving to internalize 
(naiseika) the production of some parts, and are beginning to subcontract 
with non-Japanese producers (especially Taiwanese firms) for sub-
assembly work on other parts. In other words, these once dominant MNCs 
are now playing a game of catchup in Asia. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE STUDIES  
A. Industry Characteristics Matter 
While Matsushita builds a VCR with fewer than one hundred parts, 
Toyota uses up to three thousand parts to assemble a passenger car. Given 
its parts-intensive nature, the automobile industry tends naturally toward 
vertical integration or, in the Japanese case, quasi-integration through 
keiretsu ties. As a result, assemblers who move quickly to build cohesive 
supply networks in any given market have a built-in edge over latecomers. 
This certainly has proved to be the case in Southeast Asia, where Japanese 
automakers have forged new ties with indigenous suppliers and have 
replicated longstanding ties with keiretsu suppliers transplanted from 
Japan. As can be seen, these ties are becoming increasingly exclusionary. 
B. Nationality Matters 
In every developing country in Southeast Asia, one can find numerous 
Chambers of Commerce, each representing firms with a particular 
nationality. Sharing a common culture and language, these MNCs 
generally may be inclined to cooperate with one another as they struggle to 
overcome the obstacles of operating in a foreign land. Japanese MNCs, 
however, appear to cooperate on this basis far more frequently than non-
Japanese MNCs. “We are perhaps a little clannish,” acknowledges one 
company executive.80 For example, in production centers like Shah Alam, 
an industrial suburb of Kuala Lumpur, and Navanakorn, a manufacturing 
estate outside of Bangkok, local Japanese manufacturers meet monthly to 
 79. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 80. Confidential Interview, in Bangkok, Thail. (Apr. 20, 1993). 
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discuss common problems. They do not forge binding agreements, but 
rather reach a “mutual understanding,” according to numerous participants 
of these meetings.81 
Preliminary evidence suggests that Japanese automakers likely 
cooperated in a bid to keep non-Japanese automakers from gaining a 
foothold in Southeast Asian markets. Organized around groups such as the 
Thai Automotive Industry Association and the Association of Indonesian 
Automotive Industries, Japanese automakers lobbied to maintain 
restrictive measures such as a relatively high tariff on imports from outside 
ASEAN and domestic content requirements that impede market entry.82 
Vertical restraint through quasi-integration—both at the supply and 
distribution ends—seems to have made it easier for these Japanese MNCs 
to collude. 
If confirmed, such collusive behavior would not be unprecendented. 
Documents seized by the JFTC show that Japanese television 
manufacturers began colluding in the late 1950s to capture high profits on 
domestic sales and use them to subsidize cheap exports to the United 
States. Collusion in the domestic market was carried out through a 
clandestine web of organizations led by the so-called Okura Group, an 
informal council made up of the highest executives of the six major 
consumer electronics manufacturers in Japan who met monthly at Tokyo’s 
Hotel Okura. To hang onto these horizontal ties, the manufacturers had to 
maintain strict control of their individual distribution networks.83 In their 
meetings, Japanese business executives “openly discussed and agreed 
upon bottom prices for each type of receiver, as well as wholesale and 
retail profit margins and rebate levels to keiretsu outlets.”84 At the same 
time, collusion in the U.S. market was carried out through the TV Export 
Council and its umbrella organization, the Japan Machinery Exporters 
Association, which required that each exporter specify five U.S. 
companies as its exclusive customers. 
Obviously, past behavior does not necessarily foreshadow future 
behavior, especially in an entirely different sector. However, the example 
of the TV industry demonstrates that no matter how much they may 
compete against one another under conditions of autarky, Japanese 
manufacturers may use extraordinary measures to collude in the face of 
 81. Numerous interviews, in Bangkok, Thail., and Jakarta, Indon. (Sept. 1997).  
 82. Id. As noted earlier, Japanese automakers have not always been successful in their efforts to 
maintain barriers to entry. See supra Part V. 
 83. See Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 39, at 255. 
 84. Id. 
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competition from foreign rivals. For them, nationality appears to matter a 
great deal. 
C. Government Matters 
As students of developmental history in newly industrializing countries 
such as South Korea and Brazil, host governments in Southeast Asia have 
sought to build their own domestic automobile industry. This goal has 
been imbued with patriotic pride, especially in Malaysia. To further their 
goal of automotive industrialization, these host regimes have established 
tariff barriers and domestic content requirements that give important 
competitive advantages to established vehicle manufacturers who have 
their own local supply networks (i.e. Japanese MNCs). In the process, they 
effectively aided Japanese automakers in their efforts to acquire and 
expand market power in these countries. Other industries in Southeast 
Asia—including the electronics industry—did not receive as much support 
and protection. 
Consider first host country tariffs on automobiles: 
In Thailand, the import tariff on most fully-assembled passenger 
vehicles was 80%85 until January 1, 2000, when it was cut to 
between 42.5% and 68.5% (depending on engine size).86 On 
knocked-down vehicles (to be assembled as a “kit”), the tariff is 
20% (this does not include the 50% excise tax and 10% surcharge 
levied on all such kits).87 Automotive parts are subjected to a tariff 
of up to 42%.88 These rates easily exceed those levied against other 
machinery imports like computers (5%) and electronic components 
(1%).89 
In Indonesia, the import tariff on most fully assembled passenger 
cars was 200%90 until June 1999, when it was reduced to between 
65% and 80% (depending on engine size).91 For knocked down-
vehicles, the tariff is now between 35% and 50% (depending on 
 85. TradePort, Thailand: Trade Regulations and Standards, para. 3 (1999), at http://www. 
tradeport.org/ts/countries/thailand/regs.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2001). 
 86. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “Thailand,” at 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/auto/thaiprofile.html. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Tradeport, supra note 85. 
 90. U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, “Indonesia: New Automotive Industrial Policy,” at http://www. 
usembassyjakarta.org/econ/autoaugst99.htm. 
 91. Id. 
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engine size).92 In addition, the tariff on automotive parts used in 
local assembly has been reduced to 15%.93 However, the Indonesian 
government has been moving much more aggressively to reduce 
tariffs on other products (including electronic products) to a 
maximum of 5–10%.94 
Next consider domestic content requirements for automakers: 
Until January 1, 2000, Thailand had required assemblers to maintain 
a local content ratio of at least 54%.95 
To secure tariff and tax breaks, Indonesia required assemblers to 
maintain a local (ASEAN) content ratio of at least 60%.96 
These and other public policies designed to promote local automobile 
manufacturing raised barriers for outsiders trying to break into host 
markets and, as a result, created profit havens for established producers.  
On top of such policies implemented by host governments in Southeast 
Asia, note the considerable efforts undertaken by Japan to aid Japanese 
MNCs manufacturing vehicles throughout the region. For example, MITI 
has sponsored an annual meeting of “automobile experts” from Japan and 
ASEAN countries to discuss promotional policies for this industry.97 In 
addition, MITI has both financed studies on the region’s supporting 
industries and dispatched Japanese advisers to help government officials in 
Southeast Asia devise measures to foster the growth of auto parts suppliers 
(including both Japanese transplants and indigenous firms). Thus, Japan 
has been an influential source of industrial policies for automobile 
manufacturing throughout Southeast Asia. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The two case studies presented herein suggest that MNCs may be able 
to use strong keiretsu ties as a vertical restraint, thereby limiting 
competition in developing state markets. However, this will happen only 
 92. Id. 
 93. U.S. Trade Representative, Foreign Trade Barriers, at 176, at www.ustr.gov/pdf/2000_ 
indonesi.pdf. 
 94. Tradeport, Indonesia: Trade Regulations and Standards, para. 2, at http://www.tradeport.org/ 
ts/countries/indonesia/regs.html. 
 95. U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 86. 
 96. U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, supra note 90. 
 97. See supra note 55. 
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under limited conditions. First, the industry must be relatively parts-
intensive. An automobile manufacturer who assembles thousands of parts 
is better positioned to achieve vertical restraint via exclusionary ties with 
suppliers than an electronics manufacturer who assembles dozens of parts. 
Second, MNCs from the same home country must be willing to cooperate 
with each other. Japanese automakers in Southeast Asia have found it 
useful to collude with one another to keep foreign rivals out of these 
markets. Finally, the industry must be protected by the host government 
and supported by both the host and the home government of participating 
MNCs. Southeast Asian countries have built high tariff walls around their 
automobile industries and, along with the Japanese government, have 
offered cheap credit and other forms of support to Japanese manufacturers. 
These practices have made it easier for automakers to maintain 
exclusionary supply and distribution networks, and thus easier to collude 
horizontally. 
This third condition is perhaps the most critical. When host countries 
eliminate or reduce government support or protection for a particular 
industry, they may also undermine the ability of foreign manufacturers to 
use long-term, mutually reinforcing supply and distribution networks to 
deter entry by rivals. Liberalization of the automobile industry in 
economies like Thailand and Indonesia may jeopardize the market power 
of Japanese producers in those markets, just as the liberalization of the 
electronics industry did. 
It does not necessarily follow that these governments should move 
quickly to lift tariff barriers and eliminate subsidies for automakers. The 
timing of such policy shifts is critical, a fact recognized in the Auckland 
Declaration adopted by APEC economic leaders on September 13, 1999.98 
The Declaration urges member countries to “[c]onsider issues of timing 
and sequencing involved in introducing competition mechanisms and 
reform measures, taking into account the circumstances of individual 
economies.”99 
As noted at the outset, developing economies face a different set of 
opportunities and constraints than developed economies. Firms in 
developing economies are often able to adopt successively more 
sophisticated technology from the global reservoir of knowledge and, as a 
result, are able to enjoy declining long-run average costs. An “investment 
 98. APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration, adopted at the Seventh APEC Economic Leaders 
Meeting, Auckland, N.Z. (Sept. 13, 1999), available at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/virtualib/econlead/ 
nz.html. 
 99. Id. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/11
p233 Hatch book pages.doc  10/15/02   11:09 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] VERTICAL TIES ACROSS BORDERS 257 
 
 
 
 
 
race” is inevitable as firms rush to enter industries characterized by 
declining costs or, if they already have invested in such industries, to 
expand output. Without some mechanism to coordinate this “investment 
race,” overinvestment and excess capacity occur, triggering bankruptcies 
and unemployment. Cooperation between firms, and with the government, 
may be necessary to guard against such a destabilizing outcome as well as 
to maintain progress toward development. 
Until the fiscal crisis of 1997, Thailand had the strongest automobile 
industry in Southeast Asia, in part because it solidly supported Japanese 
MNCs in their plans to recreate their vertical keiretsu and use Thailand as 
the hub of their regional production networks.100 Tariffs on competing 
imports were high, domestic content requirements were stiff, and 
industrial policies were used to promote the development of a Japanese-
dominated assembly industry and supply base. Between 1951 and 1997, 
Japanese automakers responded enthusiastically, pumping 136 billion yen 
(nearly $1.2 billion) into Thailand’s automotive industry. That was 
equivalent to 36% of the total Japanese FDI in the automotive industries of 
the ASEAN-4 countries.101 Japanese automobile parts manufacturers 
(suppliers for Japanese assemblers) focused even more narrowly on 
Thailand, choosing it for nearly half (208 out of 422) of their ASEAN-4 
investment projects.102 As the regional center for Japanese automobile 
production, Thailand is now leading ASEAN in its effort to gradually 
liberalize this industry. However, if it had moved in this direction earlier, 
it might not have been able to attract the capital and technology needed to 
quickly build a successful assembly industry and supply base. 
Of course, there is a trade-off here: in building the region’s strongest 
automobile industry—an industry dominated by Japanese MNCs—
Thailand has given up some of its autonomy and control. Public and 
private decisions regarding this industry are more often made in Tokyo or 
Nagoya than in Bangkok. Profits from auto production are routinely 
repatriated to Japan. In addition, the current market structure of the 
automobile industry in Thailand is resistant to change. Protection and 
subsidies have nurtured Japanese “insiders” who likely will dominate the 
market for some time. However, Thai policymakers themselves are 
 100. See Legewie, supra note 49, at 3. In 1996, Thailand produced 559,000 vehicles, including 
imported CKD kits, which was 39% of the ASEAN-4 total. However, in 1997, when a fiscal crisis 
rocked its economy, Thailand fell behind Malaysia in automobile production in Southeast Asia.  
 101. Ôkurashô [Ministry of Finance], Zaisei Kin’yû Tôkei Geppô [Ministry of Finance Statistics 
Monthly] (July 1998). 
 102. Legewie, supra note 49, at 9. 
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responsible for calculating the costs and benefits of this trade-off as well 
as choosing their own course of action. 
Hence, this study concludes with only one recommendation: scholars 
must take a closer look at the problem of vertical restraints used by MNCs 
in developing countries. Approaches based on neoclassical economic 
theory and Anglo-American legal doctrine have obscured as much as they 
have revealed. 
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Table 1 
 
Thai Automobile Sales (January-June 1997) 
Maker Passenger 
Vehicles 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
One-ton Pick-ups Total 
Vehicles 
Percentage 
of Market 
Toyota 
 
35,35 5,299 37,022 77,556 31.2 
Isuzu 
 
595 6,861 46,628 54,084 21.8 
Nissan 
 
6,760 2,469 22,011 31,240 12.6 
Mitsubishi 6,842 2,272 16,132 25,246 10.2 
 
Honda 21,002 n/a 719 23,084 9.3 
 
Mazda 1,142 1,502 6,968 9,612 3.9 
 
All Others 16,191 11,079 1,456 27,363 11.0 
 
Total 87,767 29,482 130,936 248,185 100.00 
 Source: Compiled by the author using data from Automotive 
Resources Asia (Bangkok) and the Thai Automotive Industry 
Association. 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Indonesian Automobile Sales (January-July 1997) 
Maker Passenger 
Vehicles 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
Total 
Vehicles 
Percentage of Market 
Toyota 4,711 52,760 57,471 23.5 
Mitsubishi 1,029 44,271 45,300 18.5 
Suzuki 5,904 37,601 43,505 17.8 
Isuzu None 31,889 31,889 13.0 
Daihatsu 5 24,420 24,425 10.0 
Timor 11,785 None 11,785 4.8 
All Others 16,191 11,079 27,363 12.4 
Total 42,015 202,637 244,652 100.00 
 Source: Compiled by the author using data from Automotive 
Resources Asia (Bangkok) and Gaikindo (Indonesian Automobile 
Manufacturers Association).  
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 Table 3 
 
Japanese Members of Toyota Supply Club in Thailand 
Name of Thai 
Affiliate 
Parts 
Produced 
Year 
Established in 
Thailand 
Name of 
Japanese 
Parent 
Does Parent 
Belong to 
Toyota keiretsu 
Aoyoma Thai metal 
fasteners 
1965 Aoyama Y 
Bangkok Foam interior trim 1971 Inoac 
Corporation 
Y 
Thai Bridgestone tires, tubes 1969 Bridgestone Y 
CI-Hayashi Carpeting 1993 Hayashi Y 
Denso Thailand Alternators, 
regulators 
1974 Denso Y 
Enkei Thai Aluminum 
wheels 
1987 Enkei N 
Siam GS Battery Batteries 1970 Nihon Denchi Y 
Inoue Rubber Industrial 
rubber parts 
1970 Inoac 
Corporation 
Y 
Kallawis Autoparts Wheels 1973 Chuo Hatsujo Y 
NHK Spring 
Thailand 
seats, springs 1963 Nihon Hatsujo Y 
Nippon Paint 
Thailand 
paint 1968 Nippon Paint  Y 
National Thai Co. car radios 1961 Matsushita Y 
Ogihara Thailand pressed parts 1990 Ogihara N 
Pioneer Electronics Car stereos 1991 Pioneer Y 
Sunstar Chemical  Pressed parts 1989 Sunstar 
Engineering 
N 
Siam Aishin brake drums 1996 Aishin Y 
Siam Furukawa battery 1992 Furukawa 
Denchi 
Y 
Siam Kayaba shock 
absorbers 
1996 Kayaba Y 
SNC Soundproof soundproofing 1994 Nihon Tokushu 
Toryo 
Y 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Name of Thai 
Affiliate 
Parts 
Produced 
Year 
Established in 
Thailand 
Name of 
Japanese 
Parent 
Does Parent 
Belong to 
Toyota keiretsu 
Thai Auto Works body parts 1988 Toyota 
Autobody 
Y 
Thai Arrow 
Products 
wire harness 1963 Yazaki Y 
TCH Suminoe upholstery 1995 Suminoe 
Orimono 
Y 
TG Pongpara Steering 
wheels 
1995 Toyoda Gosei Y 
Thai Koito headlamps 1986 Koito Y 
Thai Kansai Paint paint 1970 Kansai Paint Y 
Thai Parkerizing metal coating 1979 Nihon 
Parkerizing 
N 
Thai Seat Belt seat belts 1994 Tokai Rika 
Denki 
Y 
Thai Steel Cable Control cables 1981 Nihon Cable 
Systems 
Y 
Thai Stanley 
Electric 
Signal lamps 1981 Stanley Y 
Thai Safety Glass windshield, 
windows 
1988 Asahi Y 
Toa Shinto Paint 1989 Shinto Toryo Y 
Yuasa Battery  batteries 1963 Yuasa Y 
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